Introduction i
The European Commission (Commission) occupies a pivotal role as the key executive institution of the European Union (EU). The idea of establishing an autonomous community executive was codified in Article 157 in the Treaty of Rome and subsequently integrated into the Staff Regulations. The factual autonomy of the Commission, however, remains largely unexplored, contributing to contradictory assessments of it (Kassim 2004 ). The Commission is seen as rifted between memberstate dominance (Hooghe 2005; Kassim and Menon 2004; McDonald 1997; Michelmann 1978) , the concern for the collective European good (Haas 1958) , DG supremacy and portfolio concerns (Cini 1997; Egeberg 1996) , as well as professional independence (Haas 1992 (Durand 2006) .
The ambition of this study is to reassess the factual behavioural autonomy of the Commission vis-à-vis member-state governments, while also suggesting organisational conditions thereof. The study of Commission autonomy from the member-state governments resembles the study of the autonomy of government ministries vis-à-vis the cabinet at the national level, and also the study of the autonomy of subordinated agencies vis-à-vis the ministry level. However, the factual autonomy of the Commission is particularly challenged from various external pressures, while also highly disputed within the literature.
Based on survey and interview data on temporary Commission officials (seconded national experts -or SNEs, see below), this article demonstrates that the Commission blends departmental, epistemic and supranational behavioural dynamics, thereby largely safeguarding the behavioural autonomy of the Commission. It is also argued that in order to understand Commission autonomy, the organisational anatomy of the Commission has to be carefully considered.
The organisational anatomy of the Commission is measured by considering the following four independent variables:
• The organisational composition of the Commission services
• Organisational incompatibilities across levels of governance (Egeberg 2006) and studies of the behavioural dynamics within the College of Commissioners (Egeberg 2006; Smith 2003) picture the Commission as guided by portfolio and collective concerns and responsibilities largely outside member-state influence. Moreover, studies of political attitudes among top Commission officials view these attitudes as mainly based on nation-state (socialisation) processes, thus severely challenging Commission autonomy (Hooghe 2005) . Similarly, a vast literature pictures the Commission as increasingly integrated, fused and meshed with national government systems through committees, networks and agencies. Models of the Commission as the central hub in a joint community administration that spans levels of governance view the Commission as largely lacking autonomy by being integrated into webs of external institutions, actors and processes (Hofman and Turk 2006: 583; Trondal 2001) . It is argued here that a possible decline of the powers of the Commission vis-à-vis other EU institutions (Kassim and Menon 2004) may potentially go together with increased Commission autonomy vis-à-vis the member-states. This study claims that the anatomy of autonomy should be assessed by considering the factual behavioural and role dynamics evoked by individual Commission officials. The Commission, like most executive institutions, has an inbuilt tension between different dynamics, notably intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and epistemic dynamics (Trondal 2006) . It is argued that behavioural and role dynamics that transcend intergovernmentalism support Commission autonomy vis-à-vis member-state governments. By shifting patterns of co-operation and conflict from territorial lines towards communitarian (supranational), sectoral (departmental) and professional (epistemic) lines, the factual autonomy of the Commission vis-à-vis the member-states is safeguarded. Whereas intergovernmental behavioural dynamics uphold territorial preferences, concerns, roles and loyalties, the latter three dynamics severely weaken the extent to which territorial concerns are represented within the Commission.
Commission autonomy thus rests on a de-territorialisation of the behavioural dynamics inside the Commission. Supranational behaviour denotes that SNEs have a strong "cosmopolitan" Commission loyalty towards the whole organisation, and that they act on written or unwritten mandates issued by the Commission politico-administrative leadership. Departmental behaviour is guided by administrative rules and procedures codified in the portfolios assigned to SNEs. Finally, epistemic behaviour is guided by professional expertise and the educational background of the SNEs, loosely knit to fixed mandates from the Commission leadership. The behavioural and role dynamics evoked by SNEs is empirically measured by considering their contact patterns, their emphasis on proposals, statements and arguments from different institutions, their loyalties, and their feeling of allegiances.
Whereas previous studies has primarily studied permanent Commission full-timers (top and medium rank officials as well as Commissioners),
ii this study unpacks one under- The Anatomy of Autonomy: An organisational Approach Lipsky (1980: 19) claimed that bureaucratic autonomy is driven by actors' conspicuous desire for maximising their own autonomy. It is argued here that bureaucratic autonomy is organisationally contingent. It is the formal rules established in a bureaucracy that regulate, constitute and construct the decision-making behaviour and role perceptions evoked by civil servants, ultimately advancing bureaucratic autonomy (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 3) . The organisational approach outlined here claims that the behavioural autonomy of SNEs is considerably affected by the organisational structures embedding them. The following four organisational factors are discussed below: (i) the organisational composition of the Commission, (ii) degrees of organisational compatibility across levels of governance, (iii) recruitment procedures of SNEs, and (iv) socialisation dynamics within the Commission. Arguably, the tension between contending behavioural and role dynamics reflects the formal organisation of executive institutions. Accordingly, "organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action" (Schattschneider 1975: 30) .
Civil servants live with a constant overload of potential and inconsistent information that may be attended to at decision situations. Formal organisations guide the decisionmaking behaviour of civil servants due to the computational limitations and the need for selective search among the latter. Organisations provide collective order out of cognitive disorders by creating local rationalities among the organisational members (March and Shapira 1992) . Formal organisations are systematic devices for simplifying, classifying, routinising, directing and sequencing information towards particular decision situations (Schattschneider 1975: 58 (Egeberg 1999) . Organisational specialisation leads to local rationalities and local and routinised learning cycles among the incumbents (Haas 2004: 587; Olsen 2005: 12) .
Moreover, organisational specialisation renders mid-level bureaucrats identifying with organisational sub-goals (Cox 1969: 212) . Derived from this organisational approach, the following sub-sections suggest four independent variables that systematically affect behavioural autonomy.
The organisational composition of the Commission
Political orders are hybrids and inconsistent collections "of institutions that fit more or less into a coherent system" (Ansell 2004: 234; March and Olsen 2006: 8) .
Organisations tend to accumulate conflicting organisational principles through horizontal and vertical specialisation (Olsen 2005) . When specialising formal organisations horizontally, two conventional principles have been suggested by Luther Gulick (1937) . First, formal organisations may be specialised by the major purpose served -like research, health, food safety, etc. This principle of organisation tends to activate patterns of co-operation and conflicts among incumbents along sectoral (departmental) cleavages (Egeberg 2006) . Co-ordination and contact patterns tend to be channelled within departmental portfolios rather than between them. Arguably, organisation by major purpose served is likely to bias decision-making dynamics towards a departmental logic where preferences, contact patterns, roles and loyalties are directed towards portfolios, DGs and units. This mode of horizontal specialisation results in less than adequate horizontal co-ordination across departmental units and better co-ordination within units (Ansell 2004: 237) . The Commission DG and unit structure is a prominent example of this horizontal principle of specialisation (Egeberg and Trondal 1999) . The
Commission is a horizontally pillarised system of government specialised by purpose and with fairly weak organisational capabilities for horizontal co-ordination at the top through Presidential command (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2005) .
A second principle of horizontal specialisation present within the Commission is the principle of the major process utilised -like administration, legal service, personnel services, etc. (Gulick 1937) . This horizontal principle encourages the horizontal integration of functional departments and the disintegration of the major purposes In sum, the Commission is a 'multi-organisation' horizontally specialised primarily according to two conventional principles of organisation (Christiansen 1997), contributing to "sending ambivalent signals to Commission officials" (Hooghe 1997: 105) . During the contract period, the Commission serves as their primary organisational affiliation, rendering them particularly sensitive to the multiple organisational signals and selections provided by the Commission organisation. Hence, the horizontal specialisation of the Commission administration by purpose and process is conducive to autonomisation of the behavioural dynamics of SNEs (departmental and epistemic behaviour).
Organisational compatibility
Behavioural and role autonomy among SNEs is arguably also strengthened by some degrees of organisational incompatibility between the domestic ministries and agencies from which SNEs originate, and the Commission. Organisational incompatibility creates mutual insulations of actors and organisations, thereby establishing organisational boundaries that support organisational autonomy. One impact of organisational incompatibility is behavioural and role autonomy. This novelty argument claims that organisational incompatibility establishes autonomous cognitive scripts and codes of appropriate behaviour in different organisations (Coser 1975) . Due to organisational incompatibilities, the territorially specialised Council of Ministers has for example left less impact on domestic sector ministries than on domestic foreign ministries (Larsson and Trondal 2005) . Hence, when officials -like SNEs -enter a new organisational location (notably the Commission) that is highly incompatible to the previous organisation (notably domestic ministries), they are challenged to change behavioural and role dynamics accordingly (Hooghe 2005) . Arguably, SNEs who receive portfolios within the Commission that depart significantly from previous domestic portfolios are likely to experience a cognitive challenge towards shifting behaviour and role.
In this study organisational incompatibility is measured by the extent to which SNEs have incompatible portfolios, or perceptions thereof, between their current Commission position and their previous positions in domestic ministries and agencies.
For example, SNEs entering the Commission for the first time are likely to discover non-compatible working environments (March 1994: 70) . The physical structure of the Commission building, the presence of blue flag with the golden stars together with the member-state flags may strengthen perceptions of novelty and organisational incompatibility (Egeberg 2006) . Arguably, the sheer perception of organisational incompatibility is arguably conducive to the emergence of a supranational behavioural and role dynamic among SNEs. By contrast, SNEs are more likely to experience compatible working environments between the Commission units they are affiliated to and domestic ministries. Organisational compatibility at unit level is likely to support departmental and epistemic behavioural and role dynamics (see above).
Recruitment procedures
The autonomy of organisations may be greatly affected by the procedures applied to recruit staff. Different procedures for recruitment tend to bring in different people and keep them more or less autonomous vis-à-vis past constituencies (Cox 1969; Mouritzen 1990: 39) . Basically, recruitment may be based on a merit principle, as in most Western democracies, or on a quota principle or other systems of patronage or parachutage, as in the top echelon of the American civil service (Ingraham 1995: 9) . Whereas the merit principle recruits permanent civil servants on the basis of competence and past achievements, the quota principle typically recruits officials on more temporary contracts on the basis of, for example, professional, sectoral or territorial mandates (Bekke and van der Meer 2000: 281-282; Ingraham 1995: xix) . SNEs are not recruited to the Commission through the open competition process to vacancies based on a written test, but in a more opaque process described by Stevens and Stevens (2001: 87) as a "submarine approach" or as an entry in the back door to the Commission services.
In the Commission, the initiatives to launch vacancies and the final selection of relevant SNEs (Statskontoret, 2001:17: 34) . Arguably, because the "submarine" procedure for recruitment of SNEs is heavily governed by the separate DGs, it is conducive to departmental behaviour among the SNEs.
Socialisation dynamics
Finally, a vast literature reveals that the impact of pre-socialisation of actors is modified by organisational re-socialisation (e.g. Checkel 2005) . National officials entering the Commission are subject to an organisational "exposure effect" (Johnston 2005 (Johnston : 1039 that may contribute to such re-socialisation. Socialisation processes are conducive to 'autonomisation' of the socialisees because the socialisator educates, indoctrinates, teaches or diffuses his norms and ideas to the socialisee. Socialisation is a dynamic process whereby individuals are induced into the norms and rules of a given community. By this process individuals come to internalise the norms, rules and interests of the community (Checkel 2005) . The socialisation argument claims that behavioural autonomy is conditioned by enduring experiences with institutions, accompanying perceptions of in/appropriate behaviour (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 14) . The potential for socialisation to occur is assumed positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction amongst the organisational members. Chief to the neofunctionalist approach, the potential for re-socialisation to occur ('shift of loyalty towards a new centre') is assumed positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction among actors (Checkel 2005; Haas 1958: 16) . This claim rests on socialisation theory that emphasises a positive relationship between the intensity of participation within a collective group and the extent to which members of this group develop perceptions of group belongingness and an esprit de corps. Intensive in-group contact and interaction is conducive to the emergence of relative stabile social, normative and strategic networks that provide autonomous impact on the participants' perceptions of strategic and appropriate behaviour (Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 161; Börzel 1998: 259; Hay and Richards 2000; Knox, Savage and Harvey 2006: 120) .
Often, such networks resemble 'ego-networks' "between a given individual and his or her 'alters'" (Knox, Savage and Harvey 2006: 118) . The network literature suggests that networks are transformative entities that considerably bias the behaviour of the participants (Börzel 1998: 258; Windhoff-Hèritier 1993) . The Commission has also been pictured as a network organisation that integrates and re-socialise civil servants across levels of governance (Metcalfe 1996) . However, as an explanatory tool-kit, network approaches have to be supplemented by more generic causal mechanisms, such as socialisation mechanisms (see above) (Marin and Mayntz 1991: 44) .
In sum, the length of stay at the Commission -or the individual seniority of SNEsmay foster a slow re-socialisation of SNEs towards supranational behaviour (Trondal, 2004) . Hence, behavioural and role autonomy is fostered by the sheer quantity and quality of actor-interaction inside the Commission apparatus. Ultimately, such actorinteraction contributes to the surfacing of tight networks inside the Commission rather insulated from external influence.
Data and method
There The behavioural patterns of SNEs may be measured by considering their contact patterns (Table 1) , their emphasis on proposals, statements and arguments from different institutions (Table 2) , their loyalties (Table 3) , and their feeling of allegiances (Table 4) .
It is important to remember, however, that there may be a difference between the frequency of contacts and the importance or weight attached to these contacts. Swedish SNE policy (see above), the British SNE policy is both explicitly stated and highly co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office (Statskontoret 2001:17: 51) .
In sum, Table 1 demonstrates that the contact patterns evoked by SNEs seem fairly autonomous (departmental and epistemic). (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003: 34) .
In sum, Table 2 demonstrates that the considerations emphasised by SNEs are fairly autonomous (departmental, supranational and epistemic). SNEs have several representational roles to play because they are partly embedded into the Commission and partly into the domestic administration from which they originate.
One effect thereof is that SNEs evoke multiple loyalties (Table 3) . One important observation is that the loyalty patterns revealed above are fairly autonomous. The two loyalties evoked most strongly by SNEs are epistemic and departmental. Hence, as expected, SNEs who are positioned in medium rank positions in the Commission hierarchy attach stronger loyalty towards their own DG and profession than towards the Commission as a whole. Cini (1997: 86) also finds that "institutional identification being with the DG rather than with the Commission as a whole". Moreover, SNEs also activate fairly strong supranational loyalties. This observation challenges previous studies of SNEs that underscore their national loyalties (Coombes 1970; Smith 1973; Smith 2001) . Also, the study of Hooghe (2005) found significant inroad of supranational loyalty among top Commission officials. Similarly, Shore (2000) demonstrates that a strong sense of community emerge even among new recruits to permanent posts. Hence, the observations reported in Table 3 SNEs also agree to the dictum, "I think in my heart I still represent my self" (interview -author's translation). Hence, the assumed loyalty conflict between domestic and supranational constituencies is challenged. Moreover, these behavioural and role dynamics support the factual autonomy of the Commission. The suspicion early voiced by Coombes (1970) that SNEs are highly conscious of their national background is thus challenged by this study. A long lived assumption in the literature has been that the "secondment system would tend to produce an unmanageable cacophony" of officials loyal to the national civil service (Cox 1969: 208) . Hence, the autonomy of the Commission seems to be organisationally contingent and not only subject to what Lipsky (1980:19) calls actors' conspicuous desire for autonomy. One implication of our findings is that Commission autonomy is sensitive to reforms of the Commission apparatus. Reforms such as the new rules for horizontal mobility of Commission officials, reforms of the DG and Unit structure, and increased focus on meritocracy in promoting staff are likely to impact on Commission autonomy.
According to the organisational approach outlined here, bureaucratic autonomy is indeed contingent on the organisational embeddedness of the bureaucrats. A final note of caution must, however, be repeated: Due to the limited size as well as the overly Scandinavian bias in the data, conclusions should be drawn with caution. Nevertheless, the empirical observations presented are the only available observations on temporary
Commission officials at present, thus rendering the observations vital. The data presented also represents a crucial test of Commission autonomy, thus rendering this small N study analytically significant.
